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COMMON-LAW PLEADING - STILL SURVIVES
AS THE BASIS OF MODERN REMEDIAL LAW*
ALISON REPPY
8. Fundamental Conceptions Common to All Procedural Sys-
tems.-At this point it seems appropriate to point out, on the basis of
Professor Millar's constructive article on "The Formative Principles
of Civil Procedure,17 that there are certain fundamental conceptions
which are common to all procedural systems. The first of these con-
ceptions is that of bilaterality of the hearing, or the requirement, com-
mon to all systems of procedure, that both sides of a controversy
must be heard, and that each system has created procedural devices
to accomplish this end. The second conception common to all systems
is that of party-presentation and judicial investigation under which
the issues involved in the controversy are defined by the parties them-
selves, thus restricting the court to a consideration of the issues de-
veloped by the pleadings of the parties. Third among the concepts
common to all procedural systems is that of party-presentation and
judicial prosecution, which calls for an understanding of the distinc-
tion between the functions of party and judge with reference to the con-
tents of the cause of action involved and their respective functions with
respect to the going forward of the action, or to the difference between
going forward because of "party impulsion" as contrasted to "official
impulsion." The fourth conception involves sequence, preclusion and
contingent cumulation. Where a system of procedure provides for a
vertical division of a cause of action into stages, at each of which
certain procedural steps may be taken, it is said to be governed by the
principle of legal sequence. But where the proceedings are not articu-
late under the law in such manner, the governing principle is known
as that of discretionary sequence. Assuming the existence of such
stages, if a particular step must be taken at a given stage, it is called
the "preclusive stage," which involves the principle present in all
systems of procedure that a party who fails to act at the time pre-
scribed is barred from acting thereafter. The fifth conception involves
formal and rational proof, formal proof referring to proof, the value
of which is fixed by set rule which binds the judge regardless of his
own personal convictions; and rational proof, relating to proof, the
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value of which may be determined by the judge depending upon its
personal appeal. Orality and documentation constitute the sixth con-
ception, orality having to do with proceedings conducted solely by
word of mouth, and documentation referring to proceedings conducted
by means of writing, or by a combination of the two methods, in which
one or the other may predominate. The distinction may apply to in-
dividual parts of a system. And related to the distinction between
orality and documentation is the seventh common conception which
obtains between the principles of immediacy and mediacy, the former
characterizing a procedure in which a court deals directly with the
parties and the witnesses and the latter involves a procedure in which
such dealing occurs through an intermediate agency. Immediacy is
identified with the principle of orality, according to some authorities,
but Engleman states that the ideas of immediacy and mediacy are in
no wise coincident with those of orality and documentation. Finally
there is the conception of publicity and secrecy, or the requirement
that judicial proceedings shall be conducted in public on one hand,
and in secret, on the other. The Anglo-Saxon courts have followed the
principle of publicity, whereas, in general, at least until recent times,
the civil law countries have followed the principle of secrecy, with
the result that civil liberties were long submerged, until forced upon
public attention by pfublic reaction against the secret inquisitorial
criminal trials promoted by those opposed to the revolution. In Eng-
land Bentham's chapters on publicity and secrecy have done much to
preserve the Anglo-Saxon policy of public trials.
9. Relation of Common-Law Pleading to Other Systems.-In
order to give a better perspective of the nature and function of Com-
mon Law Pleading as a factor in Anglo-Saxon law, it may be well to
consider its relation to the other systems of procedure which developed
prior to, contemporaneous with, or even subsequent to it. These in-
clude Equity, Probate and Code Pleading, as well as Pleading under
the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the relationship of which
to Common Law Pleading will now be considered.
(I) Relation to Equity Pleading.-Equity pleading is the sys-
tem of pleading which was developed by the courts of Equity in Eng-
land, through the King's exercise of a portion of his judicial preroga-
tive in cases involving matters of conscience. The King's authority
was in the beginning handled through his chancellor who was a
Churchman trained in the canon or ecclesiastical law, which was at its
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roots of Roman origin, hence it is not surprising to find that both
systems failed to provide a jury for the trial of facts. As a result of
this characteristic, certain differences between the common law and
equity systems of procedure developed.
In the first place, at law the pleadings were required to reduce the
controversy to a single, clear-cut, well-defined issue of fact or of law,
whereas in equity, there could be as many issues of law or of fact as
the pleaders desired. This was due to the dual character of the com-
mon law court, which consisted of the judge, who normally decided
questions of law, and the jury, which decided questions of fact, as
opposed to the equity court, consisting of the chancellor only, who was
a trained lawyer, capable of handling complicated issues of both law
and fact as required in the common law court.
Secondly, and largely as a result of the first difference between
the two systems, at law, a plaintiff, in order to state a cause of action
was required to state ultimate facts, and not evidentiary facts or con-
clusions of law, whereas, in equity, he might plead ultimate facts,
evidentiary facts, and even conclusions of law, as the chancellor could
unravel the issues in spite of the resulting confusion.
Thirdly, at law only those parties who had an interest in the right
being litigated could be joined as plaintiffs and only those parties who
were subject to a joint liability could be joined as defendants, whereas,
in equity, the procedure for the joinder of parties plaintiff and de-
fendant was much more flexible.
Fourthly, at law, a party was frequently entitled to trial by jury
as a matter of right, and if the jury returned a verdict in favor of such
party, its finding on the facts was binding on the court, whereas, in
equity, a party was entitled to trial by jury, only in the discretion of
the chancellor, and if, perchance, the jury found in favor of a party
on the facts, such finding was not binding on the court, but only ad-
visory in its effect, the chancellor being free to disregard it in his
discretion.
Fifthly, at law, a judgment had to be rendered in favor of or
against all the defendants; it could not be split, so as to apportion the
liability among the defendants; whereas, in equity the decree could be
split up and given against one or all of the defendants, thus allowing
for a much more flexible apportionment of liability, without the neces-
sity of further action.
Sixthly, at law, a judgment merely determined the matter of right
1956]
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
between the parties, it did not order the defendant to do anything,
and if the defendant was not goaded into action by the mere moral
suasion of the judgment, the plaintiff was compelled to sue out an
execution on the judgment, whereas, in equity, the decree not only
determined the matter of right between the parties, but it actually
ordered the defendant to do something in recognition of that estab-
lished right on peril of being punished for contempt for failure so
to do.
Seventhly, at law, only questions of law were ordinarily open to
appellate review; if the error of law was apparent on the face of the
record it was reviewable by writ of error; if it was not apparent on
the face of the record, but was one which occurred at the trial, prior
to the Statute of Westminster II (1285) ,77 the only method of review
was after verdict and before judgment, by a motion for a new trial,
but, after the statute, such errors could be reached by a bill of ex-
ceptions, whereas, in equity, both questions of law and questions of
fact were reviewable on an equitable appeal.
With these distinctions between common law and equity procedure
in mind, it becomes readily apparent that when the court of equity
undertook to settle matters of conscience in dispute between private
parties, influenced by the civil law background of the chancellor, it
naturally adopted the civil law mode of procedure, avoiding the
technical rules of pleading as they existed at common law. In theory,
however, in equity, as at common law, the forensic altercations be-
tween the parties might be carried to an unlimited extent, thus per-
mitting the plaintiff and defendant through alternate allegations to
frame issues of law or of fact upon which the court could base a
decree. In framing his statement of a cause of action in what was
called a "bill in equity" as opposed to a "declaration at law," the
plaintiff followed no set form of action, as at common law, but pro-
ceeded upon the broad equities involved in the controversy, and stated
the facts at large, mingling both questions of fact and of law, there
being no need to separate them on the record as at law, since they were
both to be decided by the chancellor, who was trained in the art of
sifting from the complicated statements the determinative issues,
whereas, at law, issues of fact were to be decided by a jury, while
issues of law were to be passed on by the court, and both types of
issues were framed by the parties, and not as in equity, extracted
77 13 Edw. I, C. 31.
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from the pleadings by the court. In practice, however, the pleadings
in equity did not ordinarily go beyond the replication stage, and fre-
quently not beyond the answer. What really happened was that each
party stated all the facts in one pleading, though properly belong-
ing to a subsequent stage of pleading, and then these were dealt with
as if stated in a regular series of affirmative pleadings in proper order.
After answer filed, the plaintiff might amend his bill to anticipate de-
fenses, upon the new light given him by the defendant, and the de-
fendant, in turn, was permitted to make a new answer to the amended
bill. Thus, the replication was actually sometimes incorporated in
the bill, along with the issuable facts which constituted the equity of
the bill, and which the plaintiff must prove to obtain the relief prayed
for; and the defendant thereupon rejoined with new matter of defense
or excuse along with his answer. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a
replication as a mere matter of form to place the answer in issue. The
bill in equity therefore consisted of three parts, the narrative, which
contained a statement of the plaintiff's case for relief; the charge,
which anticipated and attempted to refute the defenses of the de-
fendant; and the interrogativa, which was used to probe the de-
fendant's conscience and to extract from him admissions under oath
in his answer. It will be observed, therefore, that the bill and answer
were generally framed so as. to include the evidence by which each
party sought to sustain his position or to defeat that of his adversary,
as well as the legal arguments and conclusions, which properly should
have been presented in the briefs of counsel.78
On this very point of the theory of law and evidence, common-law
pleading and procedure was vastly superior to the civil law and to the
procedure in equity. However clearly substantive obligations and
rights may be defined in any system of law, there can be no security
or freedom for the individual when judicially investigated, if com-
petent evidence is rejected and incompetent evidence is admitted.
Under the common-law system of reducing controversies to a single
issue of fact, the court could rule accurately upon offers of evidence,
admitting that which was proper, and rejecting that which was im-
proper, whereas, in equity, which adopted the civil law system of
pleadings, permitting loose, detailed statements of both law and
fact, as well as conclusions, the issue in dispute was placed in such
78 POMEROY, CODE REMIES: RE EDmS An REmFDAL RIGHTS BY THE Crvn Ac-
TION, C. III, § 401, p. 528 (4th ed. by Bogle, Boston, 1904).
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doubt that the scope of the evidence was so broadened as frequently
to permit the introduction of matter wholly foreign to the real con-
troversy. Common-law pleading, which was designed to frame a cer-
tain issue of fact for trial by twelve men, avoided this pitfall by in-
dicating the character of and the limitations upon the evidence to be
admitted.
(II) Relation to Probate Pleading.-An early, but striking com-
parison between common-law pleading and probate pleading as they
operated side by side in the State of Illinois, has been made. The
distinguished judge, who drew this contrast and who was interested
in the movement for reform of our adjective law, declared:
"It is a curious fact that in Illinois, if A owes B $10,000 and both
parties are alive, and A refuses or neglects to pay B what he owes him,
if he does not go into the municipal court to bring suit against A, he
must file a declaration, and A, if he defends, must file pleas, to which
B also files a replication; the pleading progressing, it may be, to the
proverbial surrebutter. An issue having been thus made, the cause is
set for trial, and the judge instructs the jury, as has been heretofore
indicated. Any deviation from the beaten path in the matter of pro-
cedure may be taken up by one side or the other on appeal. But if,
before B brings suit, A dies, leaving a widow and children, an ad-
ministrator is appointed in the matter of his estate. All then is
changed. B need only in such case file a plain statement of his claim
in the probate court. The administrator need not file anything. The
matter comes on for trial, either before the court alone, or with a
jury. The court may orally instruct the jury, and, when verdict is
rendered, an appeal may be taken. But no exception can be taken or
objection raised to the statement of claim, which is the only pleading,
nor to the instructions given to the jury, nor to any of the procedure.
If there be protection in the established forms of pleading, who most
needs to be protected? It would seem that no one needed it more than
the widow and the children, who, in most instances, know nothing of
the business affairs of the deceased. If there be such protection in
formal pleading, they should have the benefit of it. But experience
shows that they are perfectly protected, in so far as human agency
can accomplish that desirable thing, in the simple, direct, and ex-
peditious method employed in the probate courts. Those courts enter
judgment for just as great amounts, in just as complicated causes,
under conditions just as exacting, as do the common-law courts, and
[VOL. 2
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yet they are reversed in their finding in not one-fifth as many cases,
in proportion to the judgments entered, as are the courts having the
old and perhaps more scientific system of pleadings.""9
(III) Relation to Code Pleading.-The relationship between the
common law and code systems as to the structure of pleadings has
been largely obscured on the one hand by the procedural reformers
who, as an incident of their objectives, have played down the ad-
vantages of adjective common law and played up the alleged superior
qualities of code procedure; and on the other, by the members of
the teaching profession, who have not had the ability, or who have
not taken the time and patience required to understand and appreciate
pleading at common law. But speaking to the point of relationship, it
is clear that there are few rules regulating the substance of pleading
under modern codes and practice acts which have not been directly
borrowed from the common law, or framed by analogy in the applica-
tion of the same principle 0 In fact, the century following the adoption
of the Code of Procedure of New York in 18481 has been one in which
the common-law rules have been read back into the apparently clear
and simple provisions of the reformed procedure, the unadulterated
truth being that such provisions had no legal content except as ex-
pounded against the appropriate common law procedural background.
Code pleading is not, as many have assumed, a system having no rela-
tion to existing law. Common-law pleading has not been abolished; it
still survives as the basis for all legal investigation; it is in fact the di-
rect lineal ancestor or parent of code pleading, which literally springs
from its loin. At best the codification of pleading is only partial, leav-
ing wide gaps in the system of remedial law to be filled in by common-
law pleading, with its actual provisions interpretable only against the
79 This comparison was made in 1912 by CHARLES S. Cu=rGo, Practice and Pro-
cedure in Illinois, 35 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 858, 859 (1912), but apparently it remains
valid, "subject, of course, to the fact that Illinois can no longer be regarded as adhering
to the technicalities of common-law pleading." Edward W. Cleary, Professor of Law,
University of Illinois. (Letter, dated Dec. 5, 1955).
80 See 4 STANDARD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PROCEDURE, Introduction, § 11 (Los Angeles
and Chicago, 1911). See, also, Solomon v. Vinson, 31 Minn. 205, 17 N. W. 340 (1883);
DuNNE., MINNESOTA PLEADING, C. I, § 2 (1st ed. Minneapolis, 1899).
Rules of the common-law pleading, as to materiality, certainty, prolixity, and ob-
scurity, are rules of logic not abolished by the North Carolina Code. Crump v. Mims,
64 N. C. 767, 771 (1870). The rules of pleading at common law had not been abrogated
by the Code of Civil Procedure. The essential principles still remain. Henry Inv. Co. v.
Semonian, 40 Colo. 269, 90 P. 682 (1907); HUGHES, PROCEDURE, ITS THEORY AND PRAc-
TICz 488 (Chicago, 1905).
81 N. Y. L. 1848, c. 379, effective on July 1.
19961
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
older system. It becomes clear, therefore, that one can only come to
full apprehension of code pleading through the study of common-law
pleading.
To illustrate this point, let us take the common code provision
that "the complaint must be stated in plain and concise language."82
To one not trained in the common law this means a statement of
"facts," as Charles O'Connor, the distinguished New York lawyer and
pleader, observed, "just as any old woman, in trouble for the first
time, would narrate her grievances, ' 8 3 and whipped into some sem-
blance of order by use of a form book; to one trained in the common
law, it would mean that the plaintiff, in order to state a cause of
action, or the defendant, in order to state a defense, should state the
ultimate facts, and not the evidence of facts, and not conclusions of
law, as pointed out in the leading New York case of Allen v. Patter-
son.
8 4
Bliss in his famous work on Code Pleading,85 stated five rules
covering presumptions of law and of fact, matters judicially noticed,
anticipating defenses, and pleading evidence, conclusions of law, or
immaterial or irrelevant matters. But in each instance the source of
such rule under the code is common-law pleading; each rule is in effect
merely a restatement, in slightly different phraseology, of the rule
as developed at common law. So, likewise, as to the rules governing
such matters as duplicity, certainty, consistency, directness, argu-
mentativeness, allegations by way of recital, and alternative or hypo-
thetical pleading. In fact, express statutory provisions aside, it may
be said that if a lawyer, in a complaint under the code, frames his
allegations of fact in a manner to meet with the requirements of stat-
ing a cause of action or defense at common law, he need have no fear
of being thrown out of court on demurrer because of some formal or
substantive defect in his pleadings.80 Indeed, the prophetic words
of Professor Thomas M. Cooley seem as true today as when originally
82 N. Y. Code of Procedure, 1848, § 142.
83 SHIpMAN, Code Pleading: The Aid of the Earlier Systems, 7 Yale L. J. 179, 199
(1898).
84 7 N. Y. 476 (1852); Muster v. Robertson, 17 Fed. 500 (1883).
85 BLIss, A TxATIsE UPON THE LAW OF PLEADING UNDER THE CODES OF CIVIL PRO-
CEDURE, c. XIII, Rules Governing the Statement, §§ 174-210 (3d ed. by Johnson,
St. Paul, 1894).




written, when, in referring to the relation of the new to the older
system, he declared:
"The works of common law pleading have not been superseded
by the new codes which have been introduced. . . . A careful study
of these works is the very best preparation for the pleader, as well
where a code is in force as where the old common law forms are still
adhered to. Any expectation which may have existed that the code was
to banish technicality, and substitute such simplicity that any man of
common understanding was to be competent, without legal training, to
present his case in due form of law, has not been realized. After a
trial of the code system for many years, its friends must confess that
there is something more than form in the old system of pleading, and
that the lawyer who has learned to state his case in a logical manner
after the rules laid down by Stephen and Gould, is better prepared to
draw a pleading that will stand the test on demurrer than the man
who, without that training, undertakes to tell his story to the court
as he might tell it to a neighbor, but who, never having accustomed
himself to a strict and logical presentation of the precise facts which
constitute the legal cause of action or the legal defense, is in danger
of stating so much or so little, or of presenting the facts so inac-
curately, as to leave his rights in doubt on his own showing. Let the
common law rules be mastered, and the work under the codes will
prove easy and simple, and it will speedily be seen that no time has
been lost or labor wasted, in coming to the new practice by the old
road.,)
8 7
(IV) The Relation to the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
-Toward the close of the Nineteenth Century, the American Bar
Association concluded that legislative control of practice was highly
inefficient and that the Federal Conformity Act had produced no real
conformity between state and federal practice. In this situation the
Association placed its influence behind a bill in Congress which pro-
vided for turning the federal rule-making power over to the Supreme
Court of the United States. After much agitation and much backing
and filling, by the Act of June 19, 1934,8 Congress gave the Supreme
Court power "to prescribe, by general rules, for the District Courts
of the United States and for the courts of the District of Columbia, the
87 1 BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES, Introduction, 27 (3d ed. by Cooley, Chicago,
1884).
88 C. 651, §§ 1, 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. §§ 723b, 723c.
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forms of process, writs, pleadings, motions, and the practice and pro-
cedure in civil actions at law."89 The rules as formulated under this
Act did not modify in any way the substantive rights of litigants. The
Act further provided that the court might "unite the rules prescribed
by it for cases in equity with those in actions at law so as to secure
one form of civil action and procedure for both. 9°0 The right of trial
by jury as at common law and declared by the Seventh Amendment
to the Constitution was, preserved.
From the nature and character of the provisions of the Act of
1934, and the Rules of Civil Procedure as promulgated thereunder
by the Supreme Court in 1938, it is clear that in scope and content
they were patterned after the provisions of our various state codes
and practice acts, which, as previously indicated were founded on the
fundamental principles of common law procedure. There are, how-
ever, two chief differences. First, under the new system in the federal
courts and as adopted in several states, the control of pleading and
practice by rule of court gives a flexibility in the application of the
procedural law and in its adaptation to any need for change growing
out of new or unforeseen conditions, as opposed to the older system of
code pleading, which more or less placed procedure in a legislative
strait-jacket, leaving little room for development to meet changing
social conditions. Second, under the codes attempts to simplify and
reduce the provisions regulating pleading have not met with success.
Today, for example, the New York Civil Practice Act contains some
1578 sections, supplemented by 301 Rules of Civil Practice. In 1938,
when a comparison was made between the new Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the New York Code, it appeared that it took only
86 Federal Rules to cover substantially the area occupied by 1100 of
the 1578 sections of the Civil Practice Act and 133 of the 301 New
York Rules of Civil Practice. And finally, it may be added that the
spirit and tendency of the new system of procedure as represented by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as regulated by the judges
is in the direction of the common law, as is evidenced, to give but a
single example, by the provision that all actions must be instituted
through a clerk of a court and by authority of a court, as at common
law, as opposed to the code method of commencing an action by an
89 § 1, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 722b.
90 § 2, 48 Stat. 1064, 28 U. S. C. § 722c.
[VOL. 2
COMMON-LAW PLEADING
individual or an attorney serving a summons and complaint upon the
defendant.
10. The Status of Common-Law Pleading Under the Code.-In
the early part of the Nineteenth Century the influence of Bentham
began to be felt in America. By the New York Constitution of 1846,
the Court of Chancery was abolished,91 and a new court having
general jurisdiction over law and equity was created and the legis-
lature was directed to provide for the appointment of three commis-
sioners "to revise, reform, simplify, and abridge" the practice and
pleadings of the courts of record of the stateY2 In response to this
direction in the following year the State Legislature instructed the
commissioners "to provide for the abolition of the present forms of
actions and pleadings in all cases at common law; for. a uniform
course of proceeding in all cases whether of legal or equitable cog-
nizance, and for the abandonment of all Latin and other foreign
tongues, so far as the same shall by them be deemed practicable, and
of any form and proceeding not necessary to ascertain or preserve the
rights of the parties.19 3 Under the directing genius of David Dudley
Field the Commission formulated and reported a code which was
passed on April 12, 1848, and became operative on July 1, 1848, as
the Code of Procedure, 94 which has served as the source of most of our
modern procedural reform. The greatest single achievement of the
Code, according to Professor Pomeroy, was the substitution of one
form of action in place of the eleven common-law forms of action. 5 In
addition, separate courts of law and equity were abolished in favor
of what was hoped would turn out to be a blended system of pro-
cedure, operating under a formless action to be known as a civil
action, which was in the nature of an action on the case. The Code
also provided the pleadings should state the factsP6 in plain and con-
cise language, and that the more liberal provisions of equity procedure
should govern joinder of parties and joinder of actions, and provided
for the rendition of judgments against one or more parties according
to the particular interest of the parties involved.
91 Art. XIV, § 8.
92 Art. VI, § 24.
93 N. Y. L. 1847, c. 59, § 8.
94 N. Y. L. 1848, c. 379.
95 CODE REMEDIES. RIMEDIES AND REMEDIAL RIGHTS By TnE CivI ACTION, c. I,
§ 10, p. 15 (4th ed. by Bogle, Boston, 1904).
96 New York Code of Procedure of 1848, § 20, § 2.
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Within a quarter of a century after the adoption of the New York
Code of Procedure in 1848, the code was adopted in twenty-nine
states, according to Clark,97 and some form of code procedure was, in
1947, then in force in thirty-two states, two territories, the District of
Columbia, and in the federal courts. So, even at this late date, it still
remains true that the movement for reform, which took definite shape
in 1848, has been only partially effective. Prior to the adoption of the
new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, the states were roughly
lined up in four groups, being classified as common-law, quasi-com-
mon-law, code and civil law states. After 1938, there may be added
two other groups, the rules of court states, and outlying jurisdictions.
Perhaps a brief word concerning the states or jurisdictions in each of
the groups may be helpful.
(1) The Common-Law States.-By the phrase "common-law
states," is meant those states in which the pleading is primarily ac-
cording to the common-law rules, as unwritten law or in the form of
statutory enactment of the common law. Characteristic of the pro-
cedure of the states which fall into this group is the retention of the
forms of actions and the rules of common-law pleading under a court
system that still calls for separate actions at law and suits in equity.
Even so, the practice in these separate courts was from time to time
modified by local practice acts. Included among those common-law
states have usually been listed the following: Delaware,98 Maine,""
New Hampshire, 00 Rhode Island,' Vermont,0 2 Virginia 10 3 and West
97 HA.DBOOK OF TnE LAW Or CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 8, 25 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947).
98 Delaware.--"It has been long and firmly established in Delaware, that the rules
and principles of common-law pleading as they existed at the time of their independence,
excepting so far as they have been changed or modified by constitution, or statutory pro-
vision, constitute the system of pleading employed by the court of this State." WOoLEr, J.,
in Campbell v. Walker, 24 Del. 580, 582, 76 A. 475, 476 (1910). Separate Courts of law
and equity are still preserved in Delaware. And as to the transferability of causes from
law to equity or from equity to law, see Glanding v. Industrial Trust Co., 45 A. 2d 553
(1945).
99 Maine.-Maine began and has remained essentially a common-law state with the
practice conducted according to the common law. From time to time important changes
have been made by statute which have had a tendency to do away with many of its
technicalities, such as the abolition of the distinction between trespass and trespass on
the case and the introduction of equitable defenses. Thomas v. Hall, 116 Me. 140, 100 A.
502 (1917). (FELLOWS, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN MAINE, 35 N. Y. State B. Ass'n Rep.
880 (1912)). But according to Clark, separate courts of law and equity still prevail, but
with the possibility of interchange of cases. (CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 8, n. 67 (2d ed.
St. Paul, 1947)). It seems likely, however, that Maine will not long be able to with-
stand the new wave of procedural reform which began with the inception of the New
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, and which is sweeping forward.
100 New Hampshire.-In an article by EAsMrA, written in 1912, Present Practice
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Virginia."°4 The District of Columbia was formerly included in this
and Procedure in New Hampshire, 35 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 932, it was said that funda-
mentally, the procedure of the state was regulated by the common law. It was pointed
out, however, that under the influence of Judge Doe, pleadings had been- so simplified
that the system of procedure had all the advantages of a code without the bonds which
have hampered the use of codes. According to Clark, New Hampshire is one of the few
remaining states having the, system of law and equity sides of the court, but it is his
opinion, that New Hampshire will not long remain unaffected by the new "ferment of
reform at work." (CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 9, 30 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947)).
101 Rhode Island--As of 1912, WILL= A. MORGAN, in an article Courts and Civil
Practice in Rhode Island, 35 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 1006, stated that pleading in law
in Rhode Island cases was according to the rules of the common law, the only excep-
tions being that equitable defenses could be pleaded, counts in covenant and assumpsit
could be joined in the same declaration, as could be counts in trespass and trespass on
the case. The forms of action remained in full vigor. And a case may still be dismissed
in equity because of an adequate remedy at law. McGunigle v. Travelers Ins. Co., 70
R. I. 495, 41 A. 2d 1 (1945). So far, apparently, Rhode Island has remained impervious
to the reform under the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but it seems unlikely
that this can remain so, as the State Bar Association has made a report to the judges
recommending the adoption of the rule-making power. (24 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 190 (1941)).
102 Vermont.-GEoRGE B. YoUNG, in an article, Practice and Procedure in Vermont,*
35 N. Y. State B. Ass'n Rep. 1011 (1912), declared that "The common-law forms of
stating causes of action and defenses are in use and the earlier editions of Chitty's
Pleadings are the standard authority on pleading." The common-law forms of action
are still maintained, but statutes have removed some of the old-time technicalities. Thus,
for example, the common-law rules as to the scope of the general issue, have been modi-
fied. (Dernier v. Rutland Ry., Light & Power Co., 94 Vt. 187, 110 A. 4 (1920)).
Separate courts of law and equity are still maintained in their ancient form. But as the
same judges hold both courts the transferability of causes is relatively free. (Vt. Pub.
L. 1933, § 1580).
103 Virginia.-In an article, Synopsis of Pleading and Practice in Virginia, 35 N. Y.
State B. Ass'n Rep. 1027 (1912), J. F. BULrLI stated that Virginia was not then a code
state, that its pleading and practice was supposed to be in accordance with the common
law, although modified by numerous statutes, which, if put together, might constitute
a respectable code. The old forms of action were still adhered to and the ancient dis-
tinction between law and equity were preserved, but the same courts tried both law and
equity cases. In the same year, however, there were murmurs of dissatisfaction with the
existing system. [See Common-Law Pleading Once More, 17 Va. L. Reg. 797 (1912)].
Later, by Chapter 521, by an Act to Amend and Reenact Section 3112 of the Code of
Virginia, which was approved March 24, 1916, the State Legislature authorized the
Supreme Court of Appeals, from time to time, to "prescribe the forms of writ and
make general regulations for the practice of all the courts of record, civil and criminal,"
and to "prepare a system" of rules of practice and a system of pleading and the forms
of process to be used in all the courts of record of this State, and put the same into
effect. As a result of this Act there remained no longer any question as to the power
of the Supreme Court of Appeals to substitute rules for statutes in the regulation and
direction of trial courts. (The Reform of Judicial Procedure, 2 Va. L. Reg. (N.S.) 292
(1916)). No drastic action appears to have been taken, but there has been some simpli-
fication of procedure, such as the popular proceeding by mere notice of motion in
actions of law. (CLARK, CODE PLEADING, C. 1, § 8, 29, n. 75 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947)).
See, also, on procedure in Virginia, articles by FOWLER, Virginia Notice of Motion
Procedure; A Case Study in Procedural Reform, 24 Va. L. Rev. 711 (1938); MoRELANV,
Counterclaim and Equitable Defense in Virginia, 3 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 47 (1941); Chis-
holm v. Gilmer, 299 U. S. 99, 57 S. Ct. 65, 81 L. Ed. 63 (1946).
104 West Virginia.-West Virginia is a common-law state with statutory modifica-
tions. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PFADINO, C. 1, § 14 (Cincinnati, 1897)1.
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group, but only recently has been compelled to adopt the new Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and therefore falls within the rules of court
states or jurisdictions.
(2) Quasi Common-Law States.-In these states the formal dis-
tinction between law and equity has been continued at least in theory,
although in practice it has been weakened by statutes abolishing the
distinctions between trespass and trespass on the case, or combining
the forms of actions in the two divisions of tort and contract. Usually
in jurisdictions of this character equitable defenses are permitted in
law actions. Among the states, which various authorities have treated
as quasi-common-law states, may be included: Mississippi,105 Massa-
chusetts, 1 6 Alabama, ' 7 and Tennessee."0
105 Mississippi.-EDWARD MAYER, in 1912, in an article, Mississippi Courts, 35 N. Y.
St. B. Ass'n Rep. 902, stated: "In Mississippi no code practice exists, or has ever been
seriously considered for adoption." It also appeared that although the forms of action
had been abolished, separate courts of law and equity continued in operation, although
under § 147 of the Mississippi Constitution of 1896, cases may be fully transferred from
one court to another, and reversal is not warranted by a mistake as to jurisdiction. Lee
v. Lee, 135 Miss. 865, 101 So. 345 (1924).
106 Massachusetts.-An examination of justice Story's famous book on SELECION OF
PLEADINGS IN CIVIL AcIONS SUBSEQUENT TO THE DECLARATION (Salem, 1805), makes it
dear that the early procedure of Massachusetts was grounded on the common law. In
1851, as a result of the Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the General
Statutes (House Doc. 17), of which justice Story was the chairman, the Massachusetts
Practice Act was enacted. It retained the principal features of common law pleading but
made certain modifications designed to simplify the harsher features of the system. As thus
modified the system apparently worked well and gave general satisfaction to the legal
profession, for the Second and Final Report of the judicature Commission (Boston,
1921) stated that it had received no special complaints in regard to the system as modi-
fied as a result of the 1851 Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Revise the
Statutes and under the statutory changes that resulted therefrom. Thus, for example,
it was provided by the Practice Act (Gen. Laws, c. 231, § 1 (1851)): "There shall be
three divisions of personal action-First, Contract, which shall include actions formerly
known as assumpsit, covenant, and debt, except actions for penalties.
"Second, Tort, which shall include actions formerly known as trespass, trespass
on the case, trover and actions for penalties.
"Third, Replevin."
For cases involving the construction of the Practice Act of 1851, see Read v. Smith,
83 Mass. (1 Allen) 519, 521 (1861); Dearden v. Hey, 304 Mass. 659, 24 N. E. 2d 644,
127 A. L. R. 1077 (1939). In the latter of these two cases Section 1 of Chapter 223 of
the Act, separating action into contract and tort, was discussed.
For decisions dealing with equity procedure in Massachusetts, see Worthington v.
Waring, 157 Mass. 421, 32 N. E. 744, 20 L. R. A. 342, 34 Am. St. Rep. 294 (1892), in
which it was held that Chapter 283, §§ 1, 11, of the Statute of 1887, did not abolish
the distinction between legal and equitable causes of action; Adams v. Silverman, 280
Mass. 23, 182 N. E. 1 (1932), in which the court ruled that a defendant in a suit in
equity, by answering to the merits and proceeding to trial, waived the defense of want
of equity. Callahan v. Broadway National Bank of Chelsea, 286 Mass. 473, 190 N. E.
792 (1934).
For the forms of pleading to be used in declarations in actions of contract, see
Fernio, Mass. Gen. Laws, 1932, c. 231, § 147.
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(3) The Code States-In the Code States, originally largely
patterned after the New York Code of Procedure, the systems of
pleading and practice are statutory, but based on a combination of
the better features of the common-law and equity procedural systems.
The same rules apply to both law and equity cases. But it should be
remembered that there is a far greater similarity in the essential prin-
ciples of pleading at common law, in equity, and under the reformed
code of procedure than is generally realized. The essential elements of
causes of action which must be pleaded are not changed by the codes.
And the rules as to the manner of making allegations of the respective
contentions of the parties still have much in common. Usually in-
cluded among the code states are: New York, 109 Missouri, 110 Cali-
For an article bearing on the status of procedure in Massachusetts, see the Second
and Final Report of the Judicature Commission, 6 Mass. L. Q. 1, 103 (1921).
On proceedings in equity in Massachusetts see article by BELLEW, Equity Procedure
and Practice in Massachusetts, 3 B. U. L. Rev. 63 (1921); 4 B. U. L. Rev. 14 (1924).
See, also, Comment by CLAux, Pleading Negligence, 32 Yale L. J. 483, 485 (1923).
107 Alabama.-What was known as the Code of Alabama in 1852 contained pro-
visions for a system of statutory procedure set out in 839 sections. [Acts of 1849-50,
February 5, 1830, February 9, 1850, 43, 471:, and was adopted in February of 1852.
According to Hepburn this code was in some of its provisions "in notable accord with
the very spirit of the reform movement in the northern states." [THE DEVELOPmENT OF
CODE PLEADING, c. IV, § 168, 146 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. Changes included substitution of
a "complaint" for the common law declaration, suit was to be commenced by service
of a summons, accompanied by a copy of the complaint, pleadings were to be brief, facts
were to be clearly presented, and defects in form were not to be urged if the facts were
presented as to create a material issue in law or fact. [Alabama Code, §§ 2160, 2227, 2234
(1852), 1 Code, §§ 2651, 2664, 2671 (1886)].
108 Tennessee.-In 1858 Tennessee enacted a code, the third part of which created
a system of pleading based upon the common law. [Tennessee Code, §§ 2746, 2747
(1858)]. [Tennessee Code §§ 3440, 3441 (1884)]. Under this code all contract actions
were sued upon in the same form of action, whereas torts were redressed in an action on
the particular facts of the particular case. [Tennessee Code, § 4314 (1858)]. [Tennessee
Code, § 5057 (1884)]. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPNMENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 170
(Cincinnati, 1897)].
But the distinctions between law and equity were preserved. In 1932 a statute was
enacted modifying the Code of 1858. [Tenn. Code, § 9928 (1932)]. Limited in scope,
this statute seems unsatisfactory in -that power of the Supreme Court is limited to the
regulation of procedure, practice and pleading in the circuit and criminal courts; power
is withheld to suspend or modify any statutory rule of practice; no rule can be adopted
or promulgated unless by unanimous vote of the justices of the Supreme Court; the con-
stitution of the advisory committee provided for is not satisfactory. (AaaSTRONO, TEN-
NESSEE, PROCEDURE SHOUL£D BE STUDIED: A MODEST PROPOSAL, 16 Tenn. L. Rev. 379,
392 (1940)). Certain members of the Tennesse bar, such as Honorable Walter P. Arm-
stroig, have suggested that the state should consider the adoption of the new rules of
procedure, but apparently without avail.
109 (1848) New York.-Originally a common-law state, and with separate law and
equity courts, New York opened the way to reform with the adoption of the Code of
Procedure in 1848. Amendments were made in 1849, 1851 and 1852. As a result of the
work of the Commission of 1870, which was authorized to revise and consolidate statutes
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fornia,"' Iowa, 112  Kentucky, 13  Minnesota,11 4  Indiana," 5  Ohio,116
concerned with courts and procedure, the legislature enacted in 1886 and 1887, a Code
of Civil Procedure, known as the Throop Code. As compared to the Field Code Which
contained only 391 actions, the Throop Code numbered in excess of 3,400 sections.
[CLARK, CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 10, 46 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947)]. Thereafter attempts
were made to secure revision-in 1895 [52 Alb. L. J. 390, 408 (1895)], and 1900-
but without result. In 1909 the Consolidated Laws appeared as the product of the
Board of Statutory Consolidation, created in 1904 and under the chairmanship of
Judge A. J. Rodenbeck. This same Board in 1912 was authorized to plan a re-
vision of practice. Its report in 1915, urging adoption of a short practice act of
71 -sections and 401 rules of court, followed the English example of reform. The re-
port having been referred to a Committee on the Simplification of Civil Practice, which
itself reported in 1919, the principal features of Judge Rodenbeck's recommendations
were rejected. In lieu thereof this latter committee offered a Civil Practice Act, which
was adopted in 1920, becoming operative on October 1, 1921. N. Y. Laws 1920, c. 925,
operative April 15, 1921, after which the time was extended by N. Y. Laws 1921, c. 199,
§ 26, to October 1, 1921. See also, for the History of the Act of 1920, Rep. Joint Legis.
Comm. on Simplification of Civil Practice, 5-35 (N. Y. 1919). Since 1942, however,
New York has adopted substantial portions of the federal practice, especially with refer-
ence to examination before trial. CLARX, The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23
Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
110 (1849) Missouri.-The legislature of Missouri in 1849 passed a law to reform the
pleadings and practice in the courts of justice, which was approved February 24, effec-
tive on the succeeding fourth of July. [Missouri Laws, 78 (1849)]. This legislation
abolished the common-law forms of action and the distinction between law and equity,
with a uniform course of proceeding in all cases. When the Revised Statutes appeared
in 1855, the provisions of the code were distributed in its one hundred and seventy-one
chapters, but most of its principles were grouped in a chapter known as Practice in
Civil Cases [Revised Statutes Missouri, c. 128 (1885)], officially called the Code of
Civil Procedure. [Revised Statutes Missouri, c. 162 (1889)]. After 1938 Missouri con-
sidered the adoption of one or the other of two proposals, one consisting of specific
amendments to the old code, the other being a complete draft of a general code.
[RFPPY, Civil Remedies and Procedure, in 1942 Annual Survey of American Law, 793
(New York, 1945)]. The end result was a composite of federal and state procedure.
Such revision as was had was made by the legislature in 1945 on the basis of sugges-
tions submitted by the Supreme Court. For the story of the struggle for reform in
Missouri, see articles: ScHwARTz, Suggested Changes in Missouri Civil Procedure, 23
Wash. U. L. Q. 412 (1938); HYDE, Simplification of Missouri Procedure, 7 Kan. City
L. Rev. 225 (1839); WIEAToi, Missouri Practice and the Federal Rules, 25 Wash. U. L.
Q. 505 (1940); CARR, Modernized Civil Code of Missouri, 9 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1944);
HENRY, Proposed Code of Civil Procedure for Missouri-Parties and Pleadings, 7 Mo. L.
Rev. 1 (1942); ATKINSON, Proposed Code of Civil Procedure, 7 Mo. L. Rev. 27 (1942);
ATxiNsoN, Missouri's New Federal Procedure: A Critique of Procedural Improvement,
9 Mo. L. Rev. 47 (1944). And for a symposium on the Missouri Rules, see 7 Mo. L.
Rev. 105 (1942).
Finally, in Missouri a new Civil Code was passed by the 1943 Legislature and
scheduled to go into effect on January 1, 1944. 6 (No. 44) Am. L. & Lawyer 5, col. 2
(1944). REPY AND PoGsoN, Civil Remedies and Procedure, 1943 ANNUAL SURVEY O
A.mRxicAr LAW, 737 (Edited by Reppy, New York, 1943). And the provisions of this
new code include a substantial portion of the federal practice as provided by the new
rules. CLARK, The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
M11 (1850) California.-In 1850 the California legislature in its first session enacted
legislation similar to the Missouri Code of 1849 "to regulate proceedings in civil cases
in the district court, the superior court of the City of San Francisco, and the Supreme
Court." [California Law, c. 142, 428 (1849-1850), Act of April 22, 1850]. In 1851 this
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act was replaced by an act of the same general scope, but with more elaboration, known
as the Practice Act, as distinguished from the Code of Civil Procedure. [California Laws,
c. 5, 51 (1851), Act of April 29, 18511. The year 1868 saw the appointment of a com-
mission to revise the preceding acts, [California Statutes, c. 365 (1867-1868), Act of
March 28, 1868], and a second commission in 1870 to compile the revision [California
Statutes, c. 516 (1869-1870), Act of April 4, 18701. This second commission completed
the draft of a code which was enacted and designated as the Code of Procedure on
March 11, 1872. In the same year California also adopted a Civil Code, a Penal Code,
and a Political Code, doubtless taking from David Dudley Field's New York Codes of
similar name, as Stephen J. Field, his law partner, moved to California in 1848, became
a member of the judiciary committee of the first legislature, and hence exerted a great
influence on California legislation. Eleven days after the adoption of the Code of Civil
Procedure, it was placed into the hands of a Revision Committee to correct its defects.
A hundred pages of amendments were adopted in 1874. In this form the code has main-
tained its integrity, and greatly influenced the codes of procedure in neighboring states.
[HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, §§ 90, 91 (Cincinnati, 1897).]
Recently, however, California has adopted a substantial portion of the new federal prac-
tice. CLARK, The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
112 (1851) Iowa.-In 1848 the General Assembly of Iowa authorized a commission
of three to prepare "a complete and perfect code of laws, as nearly as niay be, of a gen-
eral nature only." (Iowa Laws, § 42 (1848)). As a result of the work of this commis-
sion, the Iowa Code of 1851 was adopted, of which the third part constituted a Code
of Procedure, largely derived from the New York Code of 1848. In 1860, some difficulty
in the application of the older code having arisen, a new statute known as the "Code of
Civil Practice, was substituted in lieu of the earlier act. Largely derived from the Ken-
tucky Code, this latter code made a distinction between a demand for legal and a de-
mand for equitable relief." [HEPBuRN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 94
(Cincinnati, 1897)]. More recently, an attempt at a complete revision of procedure was
made in Iowa under the influence of the Federal Rules. But the attempt fell short, so
that the net result represents a combination of the former state and the new federal
systems of procedure as opposed to complete adoption of the new rules. See CooK, IOWA
RULES OF CIvIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED (1944). For a symposium on the Iowa rules,
see 29 Iowa L. Rev. 1 (1943).
Finally, the 1943 Legislature authorized the Supreme Court to adopt new rules and
submit them in 1945. The net result is that Iowa has in effect adopted substantial por-
tions of the new federal rules. CLARK, The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky
Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
113 (1851) Kentucky.-In 1850 a commission, under authority of the legislature,
was appointed to draft a code, and on March 22, 1851, a code under the name of the
Code of Practice in Civil Cases, was enacted into law, [Kentucky Laws, 28 (1850)].
It consisted of seventeen titles and 745 sections, effective August 1, 1851. [Kentucky
Laws, 106-212 (1851)]. Although the Kentucky Code closely followed New York, it re-
tained the distinction in procedure between the administration of law and equity. In
effect, this merely amounted to the establishment of separate dockets for both law and
equity cases, with the general provisions of the code applicable to both types of pro-
ceeding. In substance the Kentucky Code has remained unaltered, except for some slight
revisions. Thus, by 1897, the sections in the code had increased from the original num-
ber 741 to 839. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, c. IV, § 93 (Cin-
cinnati, 1897)).
114 (1851) Minnesota.-A "Code of Procedure" for actions at law was enacted in
Minnesota in 1851, as chapters in the Revised Statutes of the Territory of Minnesota.
[Minnesota Statutes, c. 70 et seq. (1851)]. Although following the example of New
York, but the term "civil actions" did not include suits in chancery [Minnesota Statutes,
c. 94, §§ 1, 2 (1851)]. In 1853, however, the Court of Chancery was abolished, and the
term "civil actions" came to embrace equitable suits and proceedings. Although revised in
1866 [Minnesota General Statutes, c. 66 (1866)], and expanded in certain respects, in
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Oregon, 117 Washington, 118 Wisconsin,119 Nebraska, 2 0 Kansas, 12' Ne-
its essentials it was unaltered up to as late as 1878. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOP.ENT OF
CODE PLEADING, c. IV, § 96 (Cincinnati, 1897).]
For the early background development of procedure in Minnesota see ScduoCHYT,
Minnesota's First State Supreme Court (1858-1865), and the Introduction of the Code of
Civil Procedure, 11 Minn. L. Rev. 93 (1927). According to Clark, since 1942, Minnesota
has moved forward in the sense of adopting certain provisions of the new federal
practice. See The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
115 (1852) Indiana.-Under the Indiana Constitution of 1851, the appointment of
a commission "to revise, simplify and abridge the rules, practice, pleadings and forms
of courts of justice [Indiana Const. art. VII, § 20 (1851)]. The abolishment of the
forms of action and the administration of justice without the disinction between law
and equity was called for. Three commissioners were appointed under an act of the
legislature, approved on January 5, 1852, with the result that upon the report of the
commission a code of 48 articles and 873 sections, framed after the New York
Code of Procedure, was put into effect on June 18, 1852, as a part of the Re-
vised Statutes of 1852, which passed through revision in 1881 (Laws of Indiana,
240; Revised Statutes 1881, §§ 249 et seq.) [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE
PLEADING, C. IV, 897 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. The code met with disfavor among the bench
and bar which lasted as late as 1938. On June 21, 1937 the rules under the code became
judicial by adoption by the Supreme Court (GAVIT, The New Federal Rules and Pro-
cedural Reform in Indiana, 15 Ind. L. Rev. 19 (1939)).
116 (1853) Ohio.-Under Article XIV of the Ohio Constitution of 1851 the appoint-
ment of a commission "to revise, reform, simplify and abridge the practice, pleadings,
forms and proceedings of the courts of record" and "as far as practicable and expedient
to provide for the abolition of the distinct forms of action at law now in use, and for
the administration of justice by a uniform mode of proceeding, without reference to any
distinction between law and equity." Appointed in March, 1852, the commission drew up
a "Code of Civil Procedure for Courts of Record" consisting of 606 annotated sections,
following in the main the report of the New York commissioners. The code was accepted
and enacted into law by the Ohio legislature on March 11, 1853, effective on the first
day of July following. This code was incorporated in the Revised Statutes of Ohio
in 1879, with some modifications, and ceased to be designated as a code of civil proce-
dure. [Revised Statutes of Ohio, Title I of Part I1 (1879)]. [HEPBURN, TE DEvEroP-
MENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 98 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
117 (1854) Oregon.-The legislative assembly of Oregon in 1854 adopted the New
York Code of Procedure practically verbatim as applied to actions at law [Oregon
Statutes, 64 (1854)], with a separate act to regulate equity proceedings. [Oregon Statutes,
173 (1854)]. Thereafter, in 1862, in the second session of the Oregon state legislature,
a Code of Civil Procedure, applicable to both legal and equitable remedies, but still in
a measure retaining the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity, and
consisting of 1160 sections, substituted an act in lieu of the earlier statutes. Under this
latter act the pleadings under the two jurisdictions became substantially uniform.
[Oregon Code of Civil Procedure, c. I, c. V, et passim (1862)]. This code was approved
October 11, 1862, effective June 1, 1863. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEAD-
ING, c. IV, § 100 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
118 (1854) Washington.-At the first session of the territorial legislature of Wash-
ington in 1854, a Civil Practice Act, containing the principal provisions of the New
York Code of Procedure, was adopted. [Washington Laws, 129-221 (1854-56)]. Be-
tween 1854 and 1881, it was amended from time to time. In 1881 it was revised and
as revised became the "Code of 1881," forming the basis of procedure in the state there-
after. (Washington Code of 1881, Civil Procedure, 35-156). [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOP-
IENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 101 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. After the new rules were
adopted in the federal courts, Washington, under the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court, accepted the Federal Rules as to admission of facts, joinder of causes, offer of
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vada,122 North Dakota, 123 South Dakota,'24 Georgia,'25 Idaho, 26 Mon-
judgment, pre-trial procedures and the like, but in the end the new rules were only
partially adopted.
In 1939, the Board of Governors of the Washington State Bar Association appointed
a committee on judicial Administration which made a comparative analysis of State
Rules and Statutes with the New Federal Rules, which made certain suggestions for pro-
cedural reform along the line of the new rules. See Note, Changes Suggested in Wash-
ington's Practice and Procedure, 14 Wash. L. Rev. 154 (1939).
110 (1856) Wisconsin.-Even before the New York Code of Procedure of 1848 be-
came effective, the first state constitution of Wisconsin provided for the appointment of
a commission "to inquire into, revise, and simplify the rules of practice, pleadings,
forms and proceedings, and arrange a system adapted to the courts of record of this
state." [.Wisconsin Constitution, Article VII, § 22 (1848)]. Three commissioners desig-
nated by- the same legislature with the duty of revising the general laws [Wisconsin
Laws, 1st session, 181 (1848)], hurriedly completed both tasks in producing the
Revised Statutes of Wisconsin in 1849. [Wisconsin Revised Statutes, Pt. III (1849)]. Just
seven years thereafter, in 1856, these statutes were substantially repealed, and the New
York Code of Procedure adopted in lieu thereof. [Wisconsin Laws, c. 120 (1856)]. Re-
vised in 1858, this code again became a part of the revised statutes of Wisconsin. [Wis-
consin Revised Statutes, Title XXIII (1858)]. Another revision in 1878 worked no sub-
stantial change. [Wisconsin Revised Statutes, Title XXV (1878)]. See also, the same
title in the 1889 Annotated Statutes of Wisconsin. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMT OF
CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 103 (Cincinnati, 1879)].
120 (1857) Nebraska.-The procedural provisions of the Iowa Code of 1851 ,ere
adopted by the first territorial legislature of Nebraska in 1855 [Nebraska Laws, 55 56
et seq. (1855)], and as recast and expanded became the 1857 Code of Nebraska. [Neb as-
ka Laws, 41-127 (1857)]. In 1858, most all previous procedural provisions were re-
pealed, and in lieu thereof 'the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure was adopted. [Nebr ska
Laws, 110-214 (1858)]. One departure from the Ohio Code consisted of the retenion
of the distinctions between law and equity, and subsequently a title on Chancery p ac-
tice was incorporated into the code. [Nebraska Revised Statutes of Territory, Title
XXIV, 520 (1866)]. But the first legislature under the state constitution abolished the
distinction in 1867. [Nebraska Laws, 71 (1876)]. [HEPBURN, THE DEvELOPMENT OF
CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 102 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. After the Federal Rules became effec-
tive in 1938, the Supreme Court of Nebraska, under a grant of the rule-making power,
undertook to put into effect a set of rules patterned after the new Rules. See article by
CLRR:, The Nebraska Rules of Civil Procedure, 21 Neb. L. Rev. 307 (1942). See, also,
the statement to the legislature by CEaar JusnicE SimmoNs, Why New Rules of Civil
Procedure Now? 26 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 170 (1943). The entire effort came to naught and
was disapproved and rejected by c. 63 of the Nebraska Session Laws (1943).
121 (1859) Kansas In 1859 the Kansas fifth territorial legislature adopted a code
of civil procedure based upon the Ohio code. [Kansas Gen. Laws, c. 25 (1859)]. In
1867, a commission was appointed under authority of the legislature, [Kansas Gen. Stats:
c. 80 (1880)] which undertook "to revise and codify the civil and criminal codes of pro-
cedure, and all laws of a general nature of this state. This produced the General Statutes
of Kansas, which appeared October 31, 1868. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPMNT OF CODE
PLEADING, c. IV, § 105 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
122 (1860) Nevada.-By the first act of the first territorial legislature Nevada
adopted the common law of England so far as applicable to the conditions within the
territory, and where not repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States;
also adopted by the same legislature was the California Practice Act of 1851 [Nevada
Laws, 314 (1861)]. Revised in 1869, this code became a chapter among the eight
hundred or more sections in the General Statutes of the state [Nevada General Statutes,
c. XX (1885)].
123 (1862) North Dakota.-In May, 1882, the first territorial legislature of Dakota
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adopted the Ohio Code of Civil Procedure. [Dakota Laws, c. 8 (1862)]. Four years
later this act was repealed and the New York Code of Procedure was adopted in lieu
thereof. [Dakota Laws, 1-119 (1867-68)]. Because of certain defects the 1875 legislature
directed the appointment of a commission to revise the statute law of the territory, a
partial result of which was a Code of Civil Procedure, enacted as a distinct code in the
Revised Codes of Dakota. After statehood, there was a still further revision of this
code. [HEPBURN, THE DEVELOPUMNT OF CODE P.EADnO, C. IV, § 107 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
Under the influence of the Federal Rules, a North Dakota revision was made which was
approved by the legislature, to be effective on proclamation by the governor. Unfortu-
nately it merely adopted a few features of the federal system, as for example, pre-trial
procedure. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 10, 51 (2d ed. St.
Paul, 1947). For developments in North Dakota since 1947, see article by CLARK, The
Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
124 (1862) South Dakota.-For the early procedural developments in South Dakota
when it was merely one part of the De Kotas, see note 123 on North Dakota. After
reaching statehood, there were some statutory modifications. And under the influence of
the Federal Rules, South Dakota quickly undertook and accomplished a revision of its
procedure by adopting the new rules as a basis for its reform. Unfortunately, the reform
was only partial, as it repeated the mistake which New York made on modernizing the
joinder of parties, but leaving the joinder of causes of action undisturbed. After 1938,
there was an attempted revision based on the Federal Rules, but it was only partial,
repeating the early mistake of New York, where the reform merely extended to joinder
of parties, but not to joinder of causes of action. [CLAIM, HANDBOOK OF T Eh LAW OF
CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 10, n. 146 (2d ed. St. Paul, 1947)1. For a later comment on South
Dakota, see CL.ARx, The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521
(1951).
125 (1863) Georgia.-Since 1847 in Georgia the Jones Act and the Jones Forms
have been proclaimed as the forerunner of modern English and American pleading re-
form. Tuggle v. Wilkinson, 17 Ga. 90 (1855). See article by THvus, entitled, John A.
Jones, The Father of Modern Reform Procedure, 4 Ga. Bar J. 12 (1942). But cf.
MILLAR, The Old Regime and the New in Civil Procedure, 14 N. Y. U. L. Q. Rev. 1, 10
(1936). And beginning on January 1, 1863, Georgia has lived under a code originally
prepared under instructions to have it "as near as practicable, embrace in a condensed
form the laws of Georgia, whether derived from the common law, the Constitution, the
Statutes of the State, the decisions of the Supreme Court, or the Statutes of England
of force in this state." The Code of Georgia, prepared in accordance with these direc-
tions, became effective January 1, 1863, and included all the substantive law, both civil
and criminal, and all the rules of procedure then in force. Changes were made in this
code in 1865, 1872, 1882, 1895 and in 1910. Since the original code, simplicity in pleading
has been the basis of procedure, although the old forms were not abolished. And in 1887
the separate courts of law and equity were abolished and a uniform system of procedure
was instituted (Code of 1887, §§ 5514, 5538), in which both legal and equitable causes
could be set up in the same complaint and the answer could set up all defenses, whether
legal or equitable. ALEXANDER W. SMITE, Georgia Practices and Legal Procedure, 35
N. Y. State B. Ass'n Rep. 844 (1912). Thus in many ways Georgia resembles a Code
State. Ga. Code Ann., Park, et al., §§ 3-104, 37-901, 37-902, 81-101 (1936); Dekle v.
Carter, 156 Ga. 760, 120 S. E. 9 (1923); Downey v. Byrd, 171 Ga. 532, 156 S. E. 259,
72 A. L. R. 345 (1930). Under § 37-1104, Ga. Code Ann., Park et al. (1936), jury trials
have been made available in both law and equity cases.
126 (1864) Idaho.-The Civil Practice Act of Idaho, effective from February 1,
1864 [Laws of Idaho, Title I, 77-233 (1864)], was revised with slight changes in 1875
[Revised Laws of Idaho, 80-236 (1875)]. In 1887 the Civil Practice Act became a part




tana,27 Arkansas,... North Carolina, 29 Wyoming, 30 Florida, 31 South
127 (1865) Montana.-In 1865, the first legislature of Montana adopted the pro-
visions of the California Practice Act. [Law of Montana Territory, Title I (1866)].
Under a revision in 1879 [Revised Statutes, Montana, Document (1879)], a code of pro-
cedure following the California Statute, was adopted as a part of the general law. An-
other revision in 1895 revised and reenacted this code with other Montana codes, but
always keeping in line with the codes of California. [HEPBURN, TEE DEVELOPMENT OF
CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 109 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
128 (1868) Arkansas.--"The Arkansas Code has not been revised for seventy-three
years, but the revision of 1868 by Judge Henry C. Caldwell, an appointee of President
Lincoln, was a marvel for its time and is still so good that Arkansas lawyers think it
excells the federal rules in many respects." (States Move to Modernize Civil Procedure,
24 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 189, 190 (1941)). Nevertheless Arkansas is among those states which
have adopted one or more Federal Rules, as, for example, the rules regulating pre-trial
procedure.
129 (1868) North Carolina.-Under the North Carolina Constitution, Article IV,
§ 1 (1868), the North Carolina Code was created by a provision that "the distinction
between actions at law and suits in equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits
shall be abolished," with but one form of action to be known as a civil action. The Con-
stitution also required the appointment of commissions to formulate for the assembly
rules of practice and procedure, the result of which was a Code of Civil Procedure, after
the New York model, and now part of a more general code. [North Carolina Code,
Vol. I, c. 16 (1868)].
130 (1869) Wyoming.-The first legislative assembly of Wyoming adopted in 1869
the essential features of the Ohio Code" of Civil Procedure. [Wyoming Laws, c. 75
(1869)]. But it varied from the Ohio Code in one important respect, that is, in not
abolishing the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity. Accordingly, the
code contained a chapter on Chancery. [Wyoming Laws, Code of Civil Procedure, Title
31 (1869)]. See, also, Wyoming Laws, 146 et seq. (1873). The distinction was wiped
out in 1886. [Wyoming Laws, c. 60 (1886)]. See, also, Wyoming Revised Statutes
§§ 2337 et seq. (1887).
131 (1870) Florida.-Originally, Florida was a common-law pleading state, but dur-
ing the days of reconstruction, to wit, in 1873 (Fla. Laws, p. 15) it adopted a code pat-
terned after the New York Code of Procedure, only to repudiate it three years later in
favor of a return to the common-law system, modified by statute or by the rules of court
as promulgated by the Supreme Court. In the reestablished system there were some
changes which may justify placing Florida among the code states. [HEPBUasr, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, c. V, § 116 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. This was the situation as
late as 1920, as shown by the decision of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. State, 73 Fla.
607, 74 So. 595 (1917) and Mechanics & Metals Nat. Bank v. Angel, 79 Fla. 761, 85 So.
675 (1920). Thereafter, a movement was initiated by the State Bar Association to give
the Supreme Court the rule-making power and to institute substantially the State
equivalent of the Federal Rules. This effort was temporarily blocked by the decision in
In re Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 145 Fla. 223, 199 So. 57 (1941), in
which the Supreme Court itself held that it lacked the power to make rules. After
action by the legislature, in a second decision, 155 Fla. 710, 21 So. 2d 605-616, 158
A. L. R. 699, 705 (1945), reviewed in 19 Fla. L. J. 119 (1945), reasons were suggested why
the federal rules should not be adopted locally. These arguments were not convincing.
(29 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 31 (1945)). Meantime, the Supreme Court's conception of appro-
priate rules, containing some of the modifications in the new federal rules, as developed
in the dissenting opinion in the 1941 case referred to above, were adopted, but not to
become effective until the court had decided on certain proposed rules governing deposi-
tions. (20 Fla. L. J. 28, 29 (1946)). The rules adopted and those under consideration
may be found set forth in 19 Fla. L. J. 294, 305 (1945). In an article by PEMIuPs,
Should the Rules of Federal Procedure be Adopted in Florida, 26 A. B. A. J. 873 (1940),
the background of the national struggle for procedural reform through rules of court
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Carolina,132  Utah, 133  Connecticut, 134  Oklahoma,135  New Jersey,136
is succinctly stated. But the movement for the adoption of the proposed Rules of Civil
Procedure as presented in 17 Fla. L T. 43-61, 72-92 (1943) still remains to be carried out.
The State Bar Association .is, howiever, still striving to bring about federal-state con-
formity. (20 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 65 (1946)).
132 (1870) South Carolhr'.-AutbOrized by the Constitution of 1868, [South Caro-
lina Const. art. V, § 3 (1868)], the General Assembly, at its first session, appointed a
commission, which reported the Code of Procedure in 1867, abolishing the forms of
action. Enacted in 1870, in 1873 it was embodied in the Revised Statutes of North Caro-
lina (c. 122) and became a part of another revision in 1893, where it is designated as a
Code of Procedure. [South Carolina Revised Statutes, Pt. IV (1893)]. [HEPBURN, THE
DEVELOPMENT or CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 113 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
133 (1870) Utah.-As early as 1852 the first legislature of the Utah territory enacted
a statute "regulating the mode of procedure in civil cases." [Utah Laws, 132 (1852)].
This statute, called "primitive and very incomplete" by HEPBURN [THE DEVELOPMENT OF
CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 117 (Cincinnati, 1897)], was superseded in 1870 by a Code of
Procedure fashioned upon the lines of the California Practice Act of 1852. (Utah Laws, 17
(1& 0)]. Thereafter, by amendments the code has been brought into closer accord with
the California law regulating procedure. (Utah, Compiled Laws, Pt. 10, "Code of Civil
Procedure"].
134 (1879) Connecticut.-The Code of Connecticut, 1879, according to Hepburn
"made a wide and notable departure from the traditions of code legislation." [THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, c. IV, § 120 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. This "Act to simplify
procedure in civil causes and to unite legal and equitable remedies in the same action,"
(Connectitcut Public Acts, c. 83 (1879)) contained 34 sections and provided for some
details of procedure as already existent in the general statutes. Otherwise, the act was
devoted to a statement of the fundamental principles underlying the new system of pro-
cedure. More recently, under the influence of the Federal Rules, Connecticut has adopted
the new pre-trial procedure. See article by SImr.s, A Study oj the Administration of
Justice in New England, 23 B. U. L. Rev. 28-65 (1943). For recent changes in Connec-
ticut practice looking in the direction of the new federal rules, see article by CLARX,
The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
135 (1890) Oklahoina.-The Oklahoma Code of Procedure, closely patterned after
the Kansas Code, as amended as late as 1889, was enacted in 1890 by the first legis-
lative assembly [Oklahoma Statutes, c. 70 et seq. (1890)], and revised by the second
meeting of the assembly in 1893 [Oklahoma Statutes, c. 66, §§ 1-759 (1893)]. [HEP-
BURN, THm DEVELOPMENT Or CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 121 (Cincinnati, 1897)].
136 (1912) New Jersey.-The procedure of the New Jersey Courts of law was
originally based upon the English Common Law, modified and simplified by statute
and rules of court. The foundation statute, "An Act to Regulate the Practice of the
Courts of Law," passed February 14, 1797, was drawn by William Paterson, who, at
the time, was a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. The rules of
common-law pleading were, therefore, generally observed, and the practitioners relied
upon Chitty's Forms. (KEAsaY, Judicial Procedure in New Jersey, 35 New York State
B. Ass'n Rep. 934 (1912)). From time to. time the Act of 1799 was amended. But
shortly after the enactment of the Common Law Procedure Act of 1852 in England,
and coincident with the wave of reform which struck New York immediately prior
thereto, the Practice Act underwent many amendments. The fictions in ejectment were
abolished and many technicalities in pleading and practice were eliminated. Later, by
rule of court, the forms of action were reduced to actions of contract and actions of
tort. Influenced by the procedural developments in England and in New York, New
Jersey adopted the Practice Act of 1912 (N. J. L. 1912, c. 263, 377) modeled on the
English practice and limited to the law courts. (Pomw, Vesting in the Courts the
Power to Make Rules Relating to Pleading and Practice, 2 A. B. A. J. 46 (1916);
MORGAN, Judicial Regulation of Court Procedure, 2 Minn. L. Rev. 81 (1918)). This
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Pennsylvania,13 7 Michigan, 138 Illinois,'13 9 Maryland,'140 Texas. 41
Act established a system regulated by rules of court similar to that followed in Eng-
land and Canada, and represented a great advance in procedural efficiency in the state,
which fact subsequently influenced later pleading developments in New York. (HARTS-
HORNE, The New Jersey Practice Act of 1912, 3 Va. L. Rev. 18 (1915)). But under
the Act of 1912 the system of separate law and equity courts continued, although
there was always pressure for a change. (See Comment by CLARx, Divided Law and
Equity Jurisdiction, 28 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 29 (1944)). After a long struggle, New
Jersey finally obtained a new constitution in 1947, providing for a unification of its
law and equity courts, and a modern system of procedure to be set up by rule of
court. (For the story of earlier constitutional efforts at reform in New Jersey, see
article by EvANS, Constitutional Reform in New Jersey, 7 U. of Newark L. Rev. 1
(1941)). Under the direction of ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, who became Chief Justice of
the reorganized court system, the procedural scheme in New Jersey has become in
many respects a model of efficiency. The relation of the legislature and the courts as
provided by the new New Jersey Constitution was attacked as unsound by PROFESSOR
KAPLA and MR. GREEN in an article, The Legislature's Relation to Judicial Rule-Mak-
ing: An Appraisal of Winberry v. Salisbury, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 234 (1951). For a well
reasoned reply to this attack which, with his usual vigor and brilliance sets the entire
problem in its proper perspective, see article by POUND, Procedure Under Rules of
Court in New Jersey, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 28 (1952). Since 1942, according to Chief Jus-
tice Vanderbilt of New Jersey, the state has adopted the federal rules "practically
in toto." VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND Ju-
DICIAL ADMiNIsTRATIoN, c. I. Introduction, The Place of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in the Movement for Judicial Reform, 9 (New York, 1952).
137 (1915) Pennsylvania.-The common-law system of pleading was adopted
early, and except for a short period between 1720 and 1735, there has been no sepa-
rate court of equity. The Register's Book of Governor Kieth's Court of Chancery of
the Province of Pennsylvaiia, c. 5, Pennsylvania Bar Ass'n Rep. (1941); Eisenberg
v. Eisenberg, 105 Pa. Super. 30, 166 A. 228 (1932). In consequence of the absence
of equity courts equitable relief was administered through the common-law forms of
action, this being perhaps the only true example which we have in American legal
experience of the actual blending of law and equity jurisdiction. FISHER, The Admin-
istration of Equity Through Common-Law Forms in Pennsylvania, 1 L. Q. Rev. 455
(1895), reprinted in 2 Select Essays on Anglo-American Legal History, Pt. IV, 810
(Boston, 1908); CowAN, Legislative Equity in Pennsylvania, 4 U. Pitt. I. Rev. 1
(1937). As early as 1887, the common-law forms of action had been reduced to two
forms. Pearl Assur. Co. v. National Ins. Agency, 151 Pa. Super. 146, 30 A. 2d 333
(1948). In 1912, HENRY B. PATTON, in an article entitled, Pennsylvania Practice, 35
N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 904, stated that the state's practice was regulated by common
law, partly by statutes, and partly by rules of court, which regulations, in practical
effect, had almost entirely superseded common-law procedure. And the long series of
steps by which, through acts of the assembly and rules of court, this end was achieved,
was climaxed by the Practice Act of 1915, Pa. St. 1920, §§ 17181-17204, which gave
the state a modified and simplified form of procedure. ARamar, Pennsylvania Practice
Act, 1915, 64 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1915-16); 66 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 195 (1916-17).
More recently, in response to the reform of federal procedure, a distinguished commis-
sion recommended the adoption of specific parts of the federal rules. These recom-
mendations, by reason of their limited character, met with dissatisfaction. (GRAu-
BART, Pennsylvania is Moving Backward, 12 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 137 (1941); A Critic
Replies, 13 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 23 (1941); for the work of the Committee on Proposed
Procedural Rules for Depositions and Discovery, see 16 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 34 (1944);
and for Comments on the Proposed Rules of Civil Procedure Governing Actions at
Law, see 17 Pa. Bar Ass'n Q. 210 (1946)). See, for more recent developments in the
direction of adopting substantial portions of the federal practice, article by CLARK,
The Federal Rules in State Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
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138 (1930) Michigan.-According to D. H. BALL, Practice and Procedure in
Michigan, 35 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 897 (1912), the procedure in Michigan was
quite similar to that which prevailed in the State of New York prior to the 1848
Code of Procedure, that is, it was basically common law, with some modification and
simplification in form. In 1850, Michigan adopted a new state constitution, Article
VI, Section 5 of which provided that "The Legislature shall, so far as pacticable,
abolish distinctions between law and equity proceedings." This mandate was not car-
ried out by the legislature. Instead a statute was enacted which sought to shift the
problem to the Supreme Court by vesting the court with power to make general rules
regulating practice, and to revise said rules from time to time with a view of abolish-
ing the distinctions between law and equity proceedings as far as practicable. (Laws
of 1851, p. 106). Thereafter, according to Professor Edson R. Sunderland, nothing was
done for sixty years. Finally, however, in 1915, the legislature faced the issue and
enacted the Judicature Act, but even then the distinctions between law and equity
were not in terms abolished, but its provisions were broad enough in scope to cover
"a considerable part of the available field of reform, in the sense of permitting the
abolition of limitations on the jurisdiction of courts, giving a single court power to
adjudicate cases in both law and equity, to eliminate the confusion which results from
a failure to commence an action at law when it should have been in equity, or con-
trariwise, but it failed to give the court sufficient power to eliminate the objection
of want of equity in equity cases, leaving the equity court to rule on the facts en-
titling him to equity and the law court to determine whether the plaintiff has stated
a good cause of action. (SUNDELAND, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915, 14 Mich.
L. Rev. 273 (1916). The Act retained the four ordinary common-law actions of as-
sumpsit (to cover the contract field), trespass on the case (to cover the tort field),
replevin and ejectment, and the three extraordinary actions, certiorari, mandamus and quo
warranto. In effect this amounted to not retaining any of the old common-law actions,
but in establishing two entirely new actions with the old names of assumpsit and case,
which only leads to confusion. It had been far better to have adopted the regular
code single form of action. (SUNDEELAND, The Michigan Judicature Act oj 1915, 14
Mich. L. Rev. 383 (1916)). The Act also had effect on the subject of parties to ac-
tions and on the pleadings. (SuNDERLAND, The Michigan Judicature Act of 1915, 14
Mich. L. Rev. 441 (1916)); id. at 551.
In 1927 the Michigan legislature (Act No. 377, P. A.) provided for a commission
of five attorneys at law appointed by the governor to suggest revised rules of practice
and procedure in all courts of record as well as a simplified method of appellate pro-
cedure. Aided by the Legal Research Institute of the University of Michigan, and
more specifically by Professor Edson R. Sunderland, new rules providing for changes
in pleading, court practice and appellate practice were drawn up and were officially
adopted in October, 1930, to take effect January 1, 1931. (SUNDERLAND, The New
Michigan Rules, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 586 (1931)).
On the establishment of a judicial council to carry on the continuous study of
the organization, rules and methods of procedure and practice in Michigan, see Note,
15 J. Am. Jud. Soc. 7 (1929).
139 (1933) Illinois.-Justice Shope, in 1887, in the case of Pitts Sons' Mfg. Co.
v. Commercial Nat. Bank, 121 Ill. 572, 13 N. E. 156, described the system of cominon-
law procedure as existing in Illinois as "clearly defined, easily understood and certain."
Twenty-five years later, in 1912, CHARLES S. CuinG, in an article entitled, Practice
and Procedure in Illinois, 25 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 850, unequivocally declared:
"Illinois is a common-law state. Its pleading and practice are derived from the com-
mon-law" system, but they are, in fact, that system, modified, however, by some legis-
lation which still leaves them the nearest approach to the English law of procedure,
as it existed before the Judicature Acts [1873, 18751, now remaining anywhere in the
world."
Thereafter, according to Ballantine, from time to time slight repairs had been
made in the common law, such as broadening the forms of action, permitting amend-
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ments changing the form of actions, provision for the transfer of an action from law
to equity, or from equity to law, abolishment of the fiction in ejectment. But the
main structure stood substantially unimpaired, and in line with the English system of
procedure as it was prior to the Hilary Rules. (The Need of Pleading Reform in Illi-
nois, 1 U. of Ill. L. Bull. No. 1, 189 (1917)).
Prior to the adoption of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Illinois took a
long step forward where it adopted code pleading under the Illinois Civil Practice Act
of 1933. (Ill. Laws 1933, p. 784). This Act took effect on January 1, 1934, and was
in part the handiwork of Professor Edson R. Sunderland. It also exercised a direct
influence in the drafting of the federal rules, which began the same year. In lieu
of the common-law declaration and the bill in equity, the statement of the plaintiff's
claim became a pleading called the complaint, a motion took the place of a demurrer;
other motions extended to ground formerly occupied by dilatory pleas and pleas in
bar; defensive allegations of fact, legal or equitable, were to be presented by an answer;
set-off at law or under the chancery cross-bill were absorbed in the moder counter-
claim; and affirmative matter in defense was to be met with a reply, beyond which,
except in unusual situations, the pleadings were not to go. The new act left the
Supreme Court a measure of rule-making power for regulating procedure, but not as
extensive as desired. (MILLAR, Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 28 Ill.
L. Rev. 460 (1928)). See, also, article by MAcluL, The New Illinois Civil Practice
Act: Pleading, 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 171 (1933). Since 1933 procedures in relation
to a host of statutory rights and extraordinary remedies, left untouched by the Civil
Practice Act, have been amended to bring them into harmony with the Act. (FISHER,
Wedding Law and Equity, 40 Ill. L. Rev. 326 (1946)). Since that time Illinois, like
several other states, has adopted a few isolated rules, among which may be listed the
new pretrial procedure. (CLRK, Cons PLEADING, c. I, § 10, 52 (St. Paul, 1947)).
Illinois may therefore be credited with the adoption of modernized procedure prior
to the advent of the federal rules in 1938. (States to Modernize Civil Procedure, 24 J.
Am. Jud. Soc. 189 (1924)).
For other articles bearing on procedural developments in Illinois, see, WmrnxR,
Judge Gilbert and Illinois Pleading Reform, 4 Ill. L. Rev. 174 (1909-10); WHrrTIER,
Objections to Present Illinois Pleading with Suggested Remedies, 5 Ill. L. Rev. 257
(1910); CLRK, New Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 209, 213-216
(1933); JENNER AND ScurAFR, The Proposed Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 49 (1933-34); JENNER AND ScHAEFER, The New Rules of the Illinois Supreme
Court Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. of Ch. L. Rev. 752 (1933-34); -IN'-
TON, Pleading Under the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 1 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 580 (1934);
SuNDE LAND, Observations on the Illinois Civil Practice Act, 28 Ill. L. Rev. 861 (1934);
SEvERNo, Equity and "Fusion" in Illinois, 18 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 333 (1940); GorrLrEB,
Illinois Civil Proceditie, 19 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 342 (1941).
140 (1939) Maryland.-Originally, common-law procedure formed the basis of
the system which prevailed in Maryland. Reform proceeded along the line of gradual
modification of the common law so as to produce simplicity and freedom from useless
technicality. (RAwLs, Maryland Procedure in the Courts of Law, 35 N. Y. St.
B. Ass'n Rep. 885 (1912)). By the Act of 1856, which was adopted in pursu-
ance of the recommendation of the commissioners appointed under Article III,
§ 17 of the Constitution of 1851, it was provided that it should not be necessary to
mention any form or cause of action in any writ of summons and that thereafter
there should be but three writs: (1) Writ of Summons; (2) Writ of Replevin; and
(3) Writ of Ejectment. As the original writ had never existed in Maryland, the
Commissioners regarded the divisions as developed in the common-law forms of action
as absurd. But in the case of Stirling v. Garitee, 18 Md. 468 (1862), where the plain-
tiff declared in conversion, a judgment for plaintiff was reversed on the theory that if
the verdict was regarded as in replevin, it could not be supported for want of a proper
writ. Treating it as in detinue, the verdict was erroneous as not ascertaining the value
of the property. Treating it as trover, it was bad -because no damages were laid in
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trover. In short, said the Court of Appeals: "The distinctive nature of actions remains,
although the old forms have been abolished and new ones adopted."
As a result of the decision the distinction between the forms of action remained in
effect despite the Act of 1856, and this continued to be true after the adoption of the
Code of 1860. Cooke v. England, 27 Md. 14 (1867).
But in 1939, doubtlessly influenced by the new federal rules of civil procedure, by
Chapter 719 of the Acts of Assembly, the Maryland legislature gave to the Court of
Appeals the full rule-making power "in all civil actions both at law and in equity, in
all courts of record throughout the state." The power granted included the authority
to regulate appeals in civil actions and "the form and method of taking and the ad-
missibility of evidence in all civil actions." Under this authority action was taken to
modernize Maryland legal procedure with respect to the taking of depositions and
discovery before trial. (PixE AND WmrIs, The New Maryland Deposition and Dis-
covery Procedure, 6 Md. L. 'Rev. 4 (1941)]. In the field of pleading, objections to
pleas as amounting to the general issue were eliminated, and judgments by confession
were simplified. In the field of trial practice voluntary nonsuits were strictly limited;
consolidation of actions involving a common question of law or fact were authorized, as
are special verdicts by jury. Answer to specific interrogations in lieu of a general verdict
were permitted, the federal rules as to directed verdicts and judgments notwithstanding
the verdict were adopted; partial as opposed to complete new trials, became possible,
and the court was authorized to instruct the jury orally or in writing or both in
his discretion. But the rules, adopted under authority of this Act, although the power
was given, did not unite the practice and procedure in actions at law and suits in
equity. (CHEsTNuT, Maryland's Movement Toward Improved Procedure, 27 A. B. A. 3.
558 (1941)).
For final developments in Maryland, under which substantial portions of the fed-
eral practice have been adopted, see CLAC, The Federal Rules in State Procedure,
23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
141 (1940) Texas.-When Texas declared its independence on March 2, 1836, the
state was functioning under a form of civil law, represented by a combination of Mexi-
can and Spanish law, including their common law, which was essentially Roman.
[See article by BuTrE, Early Development of Law and Equity in Texas, 26 Yale L.
J. 699, 700 (1917)]. On January 20, 1840, the Fourth Congress repealed "all the
laws in force in this Republic prior to the first of September, 1836," and provided for
the adoption of the common law. Nevertheless, Texas retained much of the civil law.
Important modifications of the common law were made, the Act of February 5, 1840,
expressly rejecting-the common law forms of action, in favor of suits by petition and
answer. By Article IV, § 10 of the Texas Constitution of 1845, the distinction between
law and equity was abolished, and gradually, apart from the special statutory action
to try title, Texas adopted the single form of action for the enforcement of legal or
equitable private rights. Texas, therefore, was, strictly speaking neither a code nor a
quasi-code state.
The rule-making power of the Texas Supreme Court was thereafter recognized in
the Constitution of 1816, and in 1877 rules of substantial scope were issued. [Rules
for the Courts of Texas, 47 Tex. 597 (1877)]. But when the Constitution was amend-
ed in 1891 [Texas Constitution, Article V, § 25] the earlier spirit of liberality in
the function of the rule-making power disappeared. In 1905 in an article by MoN-
RoNEY, How to Reform the Civil Procedure, 24 Texas Bar Association Proceedings,
169 (1905)], the use of the rule-making power as a means of accelerating reform was
urged. In 1912 the Texas Bar Association recommended that the Texas Supreme Court
receive recognition as having the rule-making power. But efforts to have the rule-
making power written into the 1925 codification failed. MCDONAID, The Background
of the Texas Procedural Rules, 19 Texas L. Rev. 229, 244 (1941). After the new
federal rules, the Judicial Council secured the passage of a bill giving the Supreme
Court the rule-making power [Texas Laws, c. 25 (1925)], which was followed by the
Rules of Practice and Procedure on October 29, 1940. As Texas only partially adopted
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(4) Rules of Court States-These states are distinguished rpm
the code states, whose pleading and practice is generally, if not en-
tirely, regulated by the legislature, in that their procedure is regulated
by rules of court usually framed by or under the authority of the co rt
of highest jurisdiction-the Supreme Court. The advantage of regulat-
ing procedure by rule of court as opposed to legislative enactment is
that of greater flexibility in making changes as the social need therefor
arises, without the necessity of each time referring the matter to a
legislative body, which may be dilatory in taking action, and is often-
times influenced by political considerations. Since the promulgation
of the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, three states have adopted
the substance of the new rules in revising their procedure. Included
in the group are: Arizona, 4 ' Colorado,'143 and New Mexico. 4 4
the new rules, it must still be classified as a code state. [CLANK, The Texas and Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 Texas L. Rev. 4 (1941)]. See also, STAYTON, The
Scope and Functions of Pleading Under the New Federal and Texas Rules: A Com-
parison, 20 Texas L. Rev. 16 (1941). See, also, CLARK, The Federal Rules in State Pro-
cedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 521 (1951).
142 (1864) Arizona-The first territorial legislature gave the Governor the authori-
ty "to appoint a commissioner to prepare and report a code of laws for the use and con-
sideration of the legislature of said territory." William T. Howell, an Associate Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court of the Territory had drafted a larger code (Arizona Laws
1864, 1, Act of October 1, 1864), of which the Code of Civil Procedure was a part,
and this entire code was quickly enacted. The civil procedure part of the code was
patterned after the California Practice Act. As a result of the work of a commission
appointed in 1877 to revise the laws of the Territory, there appeared in 1887, "The
Revised Statutes of Arizona, which included the Code of Civil Procedure." H'-
BURN, TEE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLzADrNo, c. IV, § 110 (Cincinnati, 1897). More
recently, or after the Federal Rules became effective, Arizona, under this stimulus to
procedural reform, adopted the federal rules, with such changes as were necessary to
adapt them to their local requirements. See article by SUNDERLAND, Arizona's New
Rules of Civil Procedure Effect Conformity with Federal Rules, 23 Am. Jud. Soc. 215
(1940); LOcnwooD, Arizona Uses Federal Court Practice as a Model, 26 A. B. A. J.
413 (1940). See, also, Burney v. Lee, 59 Ariz. 360, 129 P. 2d 308 (1942).
143 (1877) Colorado.-Organized as a territory in 1861, Colorado nevertheless
adopted the common law and equity systems of pleadings until it became a state.
During that period some statutory modifications were made. Colorado Laws 1861,
172, 181; Colorado Rev. Stats. 91 (1868). In 1877 a system finally became a code
state, the legislature passed an act of 447 sections, providing a system of civil pro-
cedure in civil actions. (Colorado Laws 1877, Code of Civil Procedure). [HEPBauN,
THE DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING, C. IV, § 119 (Cincinnati, 1897)]. Some three
years after the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, Colorado adopted the new
rules, subject to minor variations necessary to meet local needs. See article by
BLOUNT, Improving the Administration of Justice-New Colorado Civil Rules of Pro-
cedure, 27 A. B. A. J. 158 (1941). See also, McKenzie v. Crook, 110 Col. 29, 129
P. 2d 906 (1942). For a general discussion of the New Rules, see, article by VAN
Cisz, The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 527 (1951).
144 (1897) New Mexico.The common law and equity systems of pleading and
practice prevailed in New Mexico and was practically unmodified by statute until the
year 1897, when the Code of Civil Procedure was adopted. Shortly after 1938 New
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(5) Civil Law States.-This group includes at most only two
states. In this group the systems of pleading were originally based
upon the civil as opposed to the common law. The states which began
with a civil law background, from which they have never fully es-
caped, are Louisiana and Texas. While Texas has approximated the
form of the rules of pleading as found in the code states, it may b'
contended that in respect to certain of its fundamentals its procedure
still retains a flavor of the civil law, as it satisfies neither the strictness
of the common law, nor the full liberality of the modern codes. How-
ever, in view of more recent developments which included the adoption
of a few of the features of the federal rules, it will be treated as a code
state, which leaves Louisiana 45 as the sole civil law state.
(6) The District of Columbia and Outlying Jurisdictions.-The
District of Columbia being controlled by the National Government
naturally followed the example of the federal courts in adopting the
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 40
Mexico adopted the new rules, with only those changes made necessary by local con-
ditions.
145 Louisiana.-Shortly after the United States acquired Louisiana as a territory,
a question arose as to whether the federal constitutional right to trial by jury and
by procedure according to the common law did not require Louisiana to follow the
common law system of pleading and practice. In a test case in 1804, it was held that
trial by jury was required by the United States Constitution and that common law
rules as to appellate procedure prevailed, but otherwise the people of Louisiana were
free to follow some other system. Into this vacuum, under the direct influence of Ben-
tham, stepped Edward Livingston, who had removed from New York to Louisiana
only a short time prior to the trial in the case referred to above. Appearing for those
who opposed the adoption of the common-law system of procedure, he was success-
ful, whereupon he recommended a simplification of the existing system of civil and
Spanish law. The suggestion was accepted and Livingston was selected to prepare a
code of procedure, which the Louisiana legislature adopted in 1805 (Act of April 10,
1805). This system of civil procedure, subject to some statutory modification, has
ever since continued in Louisiana.
146 District of Columbia.-Prior to the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in
1938, pleading and practice in law cases in the District of Columbia were based entirely
upon the common-law system of procedure as it prevailed in England before the adop-
tion of the Rules of Hilary Term in 1833. WISON, A Brief Statement of the Law of
Pleading and Practice in the District of Columbia, 35 N. Y. St. B. Ass'n Rep. 834
(1912). The correct forms are sought for in Cmr on PLMIANO (3d ed. by Dunlap,
Philadelphia, 1819), or any other recognized authority on common-law pleading. Miller
v. Ambrose, 35 App. D. C. 75 (1910). As the new Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now
govern in the District Courts of the United States, the district courts for the District
of Columbia are naturally included. (48 U. S. C. §§ 646, 873a (1936)). Under the Act
of June 25, 1936 (48 Stat. 1921) (1934)), the District Court of the United States for
the District of Columbia took the name of the old Supreme Court of the District.
And by the Act of April 1, 1952 (56 Stat. 190, c. 207, § 5(b) (1934)), effective October
2, 1944, the Municipal Court for the District of Columbia was required to make and
follow rules as nearly as may be to the Federal Rules. For late cases interpreting these
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Of the three outlying American jurisdictions, Alaska, Hawaii and
Puerto Rico, two, Hawaii and Puerto Rico have adopted the new fed-
eral rules of civil procedure, pursuant to legislation enacted in 1939
and 1940.111 These statutes according to Judge Clark, were enacted
to resolve all doubts as to the applicability of the new rules to these
courts.1 4 8
Aside from the fact that after the lapse of over a century, almost
a third of the several states of the United States are yet to accept
the reform represented by the adoption of a code of civil procedure,
how have the codes been received? The object was to blend law and
equity into a uniform mode of procedure. This was to be accomplished
by abolition of the forms of action and the distinction between law
and equity. A single form of action in the nature of an action on the
case was to be substituted in place of the common law forms of actions
and suits in equity. In some codes there were also provisions liberal-
izing the law controlling joinder of parties and joinder of causes of
action, but unfortunately many of the early codes omitted the latter
type of provision.
In some states, notably New York, the reforms under the Code of
Procedure, met with a cold reception. 49 Thus in Reubens v. Joel,150
Selden, J., in referring to the possibility of abolishing the distinctions
between law and equity, declared: "By what process can these two
modes of relief be made identical? It is possible to abolish one or
-the other, or both, but it certainly is not possible to abolish the dis-
tinction between them. . . . Another leading distinction between
common-law actions and suits in equity consists in their different
modes of trial. The former are to be tried by a jury, the latter by
rules, see Goldberg v. Roumel, 40 A. 2d 253 (Mun. App. D. C. 1944); Johnson v. M. J.
Uline Co., 40 A. 2d 260 (Mun. App. D. C. 1944).
In view of the trend of events outlined above it would appear that the District of
Columbia should now be classified as a code jurisdiction.
147 53 Stat. 841, 48 U. S. C. A. §§ 646, 873. CLARx, The Federal Rules in State
Practice, 23 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 520, 521 (1951).
148 HAiDBOOK OF TE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 8, 25 (St. Paul, 1947).
149 CmEr JusTcE WINsLOw of Wisconsin, said: "The cold, not to say inhuman,
treatment which the infant Code received from the New York judges is matter of his-
tory. They had been bred under the common-law rules of pleading and taught to regard
that system as the perfection of logic, and they viewed with suspicion a system which
was heralded as so simple that every man would be able to draw his own pleadings.
They proceeded by construction to import into the Code rules and distinctions from the
common-law system to such an extent that in a few years they had practically so
changed it that it could hardly be recognized by its creators." McArthur v. Moffet, 143
Wis. 564, 567, 128 N. W. 445, 446 (1910).
150 13 N. Y. 488, 494 (1856).
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the court. Can the legislature abolish this distinction? They might,
but for the restraints of the constitution, abolish either kind of trial
or reclassify the classes to which they apply; but they cannot make
trial by jury and trial by the court the same thing."
1'"
What such an attitude has meant in practical terms is that a large
part of the century following the adoption of the first codes has been
spent by the judges in reading back into the code, provision by pro-
vision, the rules of the common law.
According to Clark,'152 the objections of the courts which have
taken an unfriendly attitude toward the code reforms, are five in
number:
" (1) The necessity of forming clear and exact issues, both for the
trial and also to support the judgment and thus make the plea of res
judicata thereafter available to the parties.
"(2) Inherent differences as to jurisdiction and venue, referring
to the fact that certain actions must be brought in certain courts or
at certain places.
"(3) Inherent differences as to the application of certain statutes,
such as statutes of limitations which were drawn along the lines of the
old procedural divisions.
"(4) Inherent differences in manner or amount of relief to be
granted, referring to the specific relief of equity as distinguished from
the money damages ordinarily given at law; or to a possible variance
in the amount of money damages recoverable, depending on the form
of action chosen; or to particular remedies granted only in certain
forms of actions, such as execution on the defendant's body.
"(5) Inherent differences in manner of trial and of appellate re-
view, referring to the constitutional right of trial by jury in 'law
cases' and to the different methods of appellate review in 'law' and
Cequity' cases."
All these problems have, with a more liberal point of view on
the part of the judges, been satisfactorily solved in other code states,
according to Judge Clark, and .it is his belief that in time the courts
in New York will come around to the same view. But the very ex-
istence of the objections enumerated by Judge Clark ninety-nine years
15 Goulet v. Asseler, 22 N..Y. 225, 78 Am. Dec. 186 (1860); Cadell v. Allen, 99
N. C. 542, 548, 6 S. E. 399 (1888). Cf. Warren v. Dall, 170 N. C. 406, 87 S. E. 126
(1915).
152 CLARK, CODE PLAnN, c. 2, § 15, 88 (St. Paul, 1947).
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after the adoption of the New York Code of Procedure in 1848, plus
the fact that approximately one-third of the states are still without
the circle of reform, is some slight indication of the tenacity of the
common law. And when you add to this the fact that the great bulk of
the decisions under the codes have necessarily been made against the
background of the common law, it becomes clear why many dis-
tinguished judges cling to the thesis that the inherent and funda-
mental difference between actions at law and suits in equity cannot
be ignored-a view which has found the support, at least, of one dis-
tinguished teacher,'5 3 who stated, in referring to the abolition of the
forms, that they "are not archaic, accidental, artificial or arbitrary,
but in the nature of things reasonable, if not indeed in their essence
necessary."'"5
11. Modern Procedure Under Codes, Practice Acts and Rules of
Court-Merely Another Step in the Evolutionary Development of the
Common Law.-Have the developments which have taken place since
1848 under the various codes of civil procedure, and the practice acts
of the several states, together with the federal rules of civil procedure,
been revolutionary in character, wiping out the ancient landmarks of
the common law and the procedural experience of the Anglo-Saxon
race, extending over a period of over eight hundred years, or rather,
have they been merely gradual steps in the evolutionary development
of common-law pleading and practice? And have these procedural
advances been characteristic of the common law system only?
In tracing the growth of the Roman system, we found that it
passed through three stages of development-the first, in which the
forms of procedure were flexible and capable of adaptation and ex-
pansion; the second, in which the forms became settled and inflexible;
and the third, in which the forms were abandoned in favor of new
ideas, or merely observed as ancient landmarks of progress.'55 The
common law followed the same pattern in its procedural growth. In
the first, or flexible stage, original writs issued out of Chancery in
great profusion, creating new rights and new law. It was during this
period that the ancient proprietary and possessory real actions de-
veloped in great number.
153 KiVoN, CASES ON CODE PLEAING, 289 (2d ed. Rochester, N. Y. 1934).
154 See Note, Law and Equity in New York-Still Unmerged, 55 Yale L. J. 826
(1946).
155 ScHULz, HISTORY op Romm SciENcE, c. m, 26 (Oxford, 1946).
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After the Provisions of Oxford in 1258 the power of the Clerks in
Chancery was restricted, the real and mixed actions became so highly
technical, difficult to manage and lengthy in process, that they be-
came inflexible and in consequence the common law lost some of its
power of expansion. During this period of inflexibility, an effort tG
restore the authority of the Clerks in Chancery was made so that they
might again create new rights by issuing new writs under Chapter 24
of the Statute of Westminster 11 (1285). But the effort came too late,
so that the residuary power of Chancery was invoked to supplement
the common law, not necessarily because of the defects in the common
law, but rather for reasons of state policy.
As a result of the statute perhaps, but more as a result of the
growing social, economic and mercantile needs of England the modern
personal common-law actions, which to some extent ran parallel to the
ancient proprietary and possessory actions, and which were gradually
emerging into greater prominence with the decline of these actions,
were substituted in lieu of the old real actions which had predominated
during the early developmental period of the common law, in a manner
clearly analogous to the development under the Roman law. In the
course of time, these modern forms of action, like the Roman forms,
latest in point of growth, in the third stage of development, through
which every society passes, were abolished in favor of a single, form-
less, form of action, under which remedies could be provided for the
violation of private rights of most any character. And when the
Roman law passed through these three stages of growth, it is not re-
corded that any one ever urged that these stages constituted anything
other than the normal evolutionary development of a system of pro-
cedure, which is an inevitable incident of the gradual growth of civi-
lized out of a barbaric or primitive society.
With this striking and sobering parallel of the Roman and
Common-Law systems in mind, let us swiftly glance back over the
territory covered, and with the perspective of almost a thousand years
in mind, view the present status of common-law pleading and pro-
cedure as it stands in the light of modern reforms.
From the reign of Edward I (1272-1306) to 1848, a period of five
hundred and seventy-six years elapsed, during which period, in both
England and the United States, legal procedure was governed by the
common law. When, in England, the modern common-law actions
were substituted in the place of the old real actions, as previously ob-
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served,116 it was assumed that such an occurrence was merely a normal
evolutionary development of the common law, based upon the change
in the English social structure from one of a feudal to one of a com-
mercial or industrial character. This change became official or was
procedurally recognized by the Real Property Limitations Act of
1833,157 which abolished the real and mixed actions.
When, therefore, in 1848, the New York Code of Procedure at-
tempted to obliterate the distinctions between law and equity, abol-
ished the common law actions, and substituted in lieu thereof, the
modern common-law actions, the world was witnessing, not a revolu-
tionary reform which swept the common-law system from its ancient
moorings, but merely a third step, like that which took place in the
Roman system, in the evolutionary development of common-law pro-
cedure.
Between 1848 and 1947, according to Clark,15 only twenty-nine
out of the forty-eight states followed New York in establishing code
systems of procedure. And in those states which did follow New
York's example, the intervening one hundred years have been spent
largely in reading back into the various code provisions the ap-
propriate rule of the common law.
By the Supreme Court of Judicature Act of 1873,11 now largely
replaced by the Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation Act of
1925), 1 0 England followed New York in the abolition of the Com-
mon-law actions in favor of a single form of action.' 61 Yet no one
suggested that this development in England was anything other than
an evolutionary change in the common law, albeit long overdue.
Finally, in 1938, came the long awaited new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which sought to and did place the regulation of
pleading and practice in the federal courts and in the District of Co-
lumbia in the hands of the Supreme Court of the United States as
opposed to Congress. Some five or six states have in whole or par-
156 No specific date on which this occurred may be assigned but the process was
completed by the Real Property Limitations Act of 1833, 3 & 4 Wim. IV., c. 27, § 36.
157 3 & 4 Wim. IV., c. 27, § 36.
158 CLARK, HANDBOOK or THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING, C. I, § 8, 25 (2d ed. St.
Paul, 1947).
159 36 & 37 Vic. c. 66.
160 15 & 16 Geo. V. c. 49.
161 See article by HEPBURN, In the Hope of a New Birth of One Form of Action,
Part II, The Statutory One Form of Action, 13 Va. L. Rev. 69, 78-83 (1926).
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tially, emulated the federal courts in regulating procedure by rule of
courts as opposed to legislative fiat.
So, whether we view the issues-in the long perspective of the
Roman law; whether we stand in the period of the common law when
the real actions were gradually being replaced by the common-law
actions; whether we start with the abolition of the common-law forms
of action by the New York Code of Procedure in 1848, in favor of the
single, formless form of action, in the nature of an action of trespass
on the case, or whether we look at the situation today in the light of
our most recent procedural reform under the new Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,--viewed in its proper historical perspective, any un-
biased and well-informed student of legal history generally, and of
legal procedure specifically, will be forced to admit that each new
change in our system of procedure by way of reform was but another
evolutionary step in the development of the common law and to ac-
knowledge the stubborn fact that common-law pleading, despite the
passage of almost seven centuries, still survives as the basis of our
modern legal procedural systems, both state and federal. 2
162 In Grobart et al. v. Society For Establishing Useful Manufactures, et al., 2 N. J. L.
136, 65 A. 2d 833, 839 (1949), in referring to the present status of common-law
pleading, Cmxv J sTicE ARTniR VANDERBiLT declared:
"The pleadings in the casd at bar are lengthy, but the same principles are applicable
to them as to the simplest case. The flexibility and seeming informality of pleadings
under the new Rules should not deceive one into believing that the essentials of sound
pleading at law or in equity have been abandoned. Quite the contrary; the objective
of reaching an issue of law or of fact in two or at the most three simple pleadings has
been attained, but not at the sacrifice of stating the elements of a claim or of a defense.
They remain the same as at common law as a matter to substantive law as well as of
good pleading."
And W=rA_ WIRr BLumE, a distinguished authority on both ancient and modern
procedure, after a long and thorough survey of reform movements in both England and
America, in an article, Theory of Pleading: A Survey Including the Federal Rules, 47
Mich. L. Rev. 297, 339-340 (1949), in summarizing the common-law principles of plead-
ing still in effect, declared:
"1. A judgment of a court of record is a conclusion drawn from premises appear-
ing on the face of the judgment record.
2. A judgment record contains statements of claim and defense, verdicts, and
findings of fact, but not evidence introduced at trial.
3. In rendering judgment on a claim or defense the court must determine the legal
sufficiency of the claim or defense.
4. In determining the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense the court looks only
to the pleadings which form a part of the record.
5. For the court to be able to determine the legal sufficiency of a claim or defense it
must be legally complete.
6. A question of legal sufficiency may be raised before judgment by demurrer or
motion, or after judgment by writ of error.
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7. If before trial a claim or defense is found to be legally insufficient judgment is
for opposite party unless amendment is allowed.
8. If before trial a claim or defense is found to be legally sufficient judgment is for
pleader unless opposite party is allowed to raise an issue of fact.
9. If after trial a claim or defense is found to be legally insufficient judgment is for
opposite party even though verdict is for the pleader.
10. If after trial a claim or defense is found to be legally sufficient judgment is for
pleader if the facts pleaded are found to be true.
11. In determining the truth of a legally sufficient claim or defense the court looks
only to the pleadings and verdict or findings.
12. Material facts pleaded by one party and not denied by the other party are
deemed to be true.
13. Material facts pleaded by one party and denied by the other party are deemed
true or false in accordance with the verdict or findings.
14. Pleadings serve as a record of matters admitted by failure to deny, and of
matters found by a general verdict.
15. The record of a court of record, which includes the pleadings, is an indisputa-
ble record of matters adjudicated.
16. For the record to be true, matters proved may not "vary" from matters
pleaded.
17. Having pleaded one material matter, a party may not surprise his opponent by
proving a different matter.
18. To prevent surprise at the trial the plaintiff must plead items of special damage.
19. To prevent surprise at the trial the plaintiff may be required to furnish a bill of
particulars.
20. To prevent surprise and future relitigation a claim or defense should be identi-
fied by details such as time and place.
Except to the extent that parties are permitted to form new issues by evidence intro-
duced at the trial, the above principles are as valid today as they were at common law."
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